Recent technological advances in robotics and artificial intelligence (AI) have revitalized the belief that intelligent machines-machines that mimic or even exceed human cognition abilities-could become a tangible reality in the very near future. This belief is reemerging despite the fact that the AI research community has established the boundaries of intelligent behavior within severely limiting conditions and situations and thus favors terms such as embodied cognition and situated cognition [1] . In this context, the gap between the expectations of what AI can offer and what is actually possible within the remit of reality is growing rapidly.
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In this article, I discuss possibilities for development of intelligent machines from an artistic perspective by presenting three of my recent works. The first of these works is Flies (2013), which engages with one of the interpretations of consciousness in AI and is inspired by the Searle-Dennett debate. The next work is EDNCFF (2013), which utilizes theories of socially situated AI, expressive-AI and human-centered design to propose an alternative approach for creating a computer's agency. And last is AI Prison (2014), which addresses why computers' intentionality may be simply forbidden by the very nature of software and hardware commonly used in AI.
The use of AI techniques and tools is not a requirement for the development of the artworks because the core issues discussed are predominantly ontological rather than technical. In fact, no part of the software used for the development of the three works makes use of AI despite it being relevant to all three. The remaining sections of this article offer a discussion around the theory and praxis behind these works.
FLIES: A CRITIQUE OF STRONG AI
In each of 16 squares on a computer screen, a smaller colored square moves randomly within it (Fig. 1) Flies is an audiovisual artwork that presents an interpretation of the controversy around the idea of consciousness in computers, where consciousness is defined as "sense of selfhood, understanding and intentional acting on reality. " This definition closely relates to the concept of strong AI, and the artwork is inspired by the historical debate involving its meaning and implications as presented in the correspondence between the philosophers John R. Searle and Daniel C. Dennett [2] . The definition of strong AI is presented by Searle as follows: "The appropriately programmed computer really is a mind in the sense that computers given the right program can be literally said to understand and have other cognitive states" [3] . Thus, the correctly programmed computer would not simply simulate the way a mind works (defined as weak AI), but it would be a mind of its own and therefore be conscious. Searle believes that strong AI is not achievable because no evidence in neurological research demonstrates that consciousness originates from mechanical processes nor does the evidence indicate where in the brain consciousness might take place. Dennett has argued the opposite in his theory known as the "multiple drafts model of consciousness" (MDMC) [4] . His theory rejects the notion of a central place where consciousness occurs, and it describes mental states as a continuous flux of parallel information The author presents three of his artworks that engage with issues surrounding artificial intelligence (AI) research. The artworks provide a means for discussing issues that are predominantly ontological rather than technical; while the author used a variety of computational methods in the development of the artworks, he did not make use of any AI techniques and tools. The discussion is carried on in a speculative manner that draws from concept art, academic research and sci-fi culture.
processing that happens in many specialized places of the brain at diff erent times. Th e transition between unconsciousness and consciousness cannot be timed, and our mind is nothing beyond a chain of processes in our nervous system. Flies engages with this debate by attempting to visualize the genesis of a thought by a computer. Th e eventual emergence of this thought is then speculatively interpreted as a sign of consciousness. Th e series of moving and, at times, buzzing squares stands as a metaphor for human neural activity. Th e simplicity of the coding algorithm that generates the graphics refl ects the opinion that if consciousness were to be generated by mechanical processes, consciousness would happen regardless of the complexity of the computational algorithms in use (e.g. AI). Th us, even the simplest of programs could be thought to be conscious (although to a very minimal degree). From this perspective, Flies is in line with Searle's opinion because there is no way to establish objectively whether "the fi rst-person conscious feelings and experiences we all have" [5] are experienced by the program. Nevertheless, I do not discard Dennett's idea of consciousness as a third-person phenomenon. Th e several buzzing sequences generated by the squares colliding with the borders of their delimiting spaces represent the sonifi cation of the computer's thoughts. Th us, the computer talks but it does so in an unknown language. When the computer talks, there is nothing prohibiting a member of an audience from thinking that the sonifi cation of the computer's thoughts is a clear manifestation of the computer's inner consciousness.
It is the evaluation of the role of the observer and its relational dynamics with the computer that form the basis for the second artwork presented here.
EDNCFF: REVERSING PERSPECTIVES

A computer monitor, disguised as an old TV, is placed in a public space (Fig. ). While playing semi-random videos from the Web to catch the attention of passersby, the computer looks continuously for all in-range Bluetooth devices (e.g. phones, tablets, laptops, etc.). When a device is found, the computer stops playing the videos and fl atters the found device with a love message that is spoken out loud via the internal computer speakers.
In 1968 Edward Ihnatowicz publicly exhibited the Sound-Activated Mobile (SAM), an analogic robotic sculpture able to move in the direction of noise created by a nearby audience [6] . Several digital artists have since developed similar structures investigating the human-machine relationship, some using traditional sensing and computer means. Others, such as Stelarc (1946-) with his Articulated Head [7] , have used sensing technology and sophisticated AI techniques to develop robots able to verbally communicate with humans.
Th e idea that artifi cial intelligence, rather than being imagined as an intrinsic attribute of computers, manifests instead in the interaction between the machine and its environment is not new to AI. Interactionist AI theories such as Mateas's culturally oriented approach to AI-based art (Expressive AI) [8] and Sengers's idea of socially situated AI [9] have indeed highlighted the importance of agency, audience and authorship for the manifestation of intelligence in AI. In all cases, however, the dream for a real form of artifi cial intelligentia is short lived. Th is is because, as pointed out by Moulthrop in relation to hypertext art, "Th e constantly repeated ritual of the interaction reveals the text [read dialogue] as a made thing, not monologic perhaps, but hardly indeterminate" [10] . Once the dream fades out, the system is better described in terms of human-centered design in which the computer is seen as a medium for the communication between two humans: the designer (i.e. artist) and the user (i.e. audience) [11] . On these premises, my work entitled Entertainment does not come for free . . . (EDNCFF) attempts to respond to the dream of nonhuman agency by speculatively reversing the roles of the actors in the human-computer system. A computer-centered design, as opposed to a human-centered one, informs the development of the system/artwork.
EDNCFF transforms the human (audience) into a tool allowing communication between nonhuman agencies. Th e computer knows [12] that it can communicate with peers (other Bluetooth devices) only if these are within a specifi c range (ca. 8 meters). Th e computer also knows that humans carry Bluetooth devices with them most of the time. Some strategy needs to be put in place to get them in close proximity. Th e computer, in a public space under false identity, assumes that humans are drawn to funny videos on the basis that it has itself been previously used for that purpose for large amounts of time. Th is action is used as a hook to attract the attention of passersby and to get them close to the monitor. If the computer is successful, and if the individual has the device's Bluetooth settings on, the computer will broadcast to the in-range device by calling it by name and fl attering it with a love message.
Th e computer-centered design was developed around the following similarities and contrasts with its human-centered counterpart:
• Language: In human-centered design, lines of code are used to emulate human language and behavior. Th is is because the audience is the recipient of the message sent from the author. In contrast, EDNCFF adopts human language (the fl attering love message) as a vehicle for enabling the computer-to-computer communication.
• Spatial Relationship: Th e movement and interactions between the computer and audience are what have been described as the fuel for evoking agency. Th e designer is an invisible presence and can be thought of as remaining still. EDNCFF presents this relationship with roles reversed. Now it is the humans and the devices they carry that move around. Th e main computer remains still.
• Dialogue: In human-centered interactions the dialogue is generally implicit. Th is means that the communication between the designer and an audience does not manifest directly because it is part of an implicit dialogic process. In the computer-centered interactions the communication between the two agents is, instead, explicit in that the computer addresses another device directly, although by means of pseudo-human language.
Considering the short amount of time a casual passerby may spend in front of an old TV, EDNCFF consists of a 60-second loop overall. Th e loop is interrupted only if a Bluetooth device is found. Th en the title of the installation is displayed. It is at this moment that the passerby is invited to refl ect on what just happened. Th e entertainment (i.e. videos displayed), apparently free, comes at the cost of the audience's personal data. Th e audience may fi nd this experience playful and fun, but the audience may also feel used. Bringing to mind ideas and fears from sci-fi literature and cinematography, EDNCFF off ers a tangible, although brief and primordial, experience of how it feels to be used by a computer whose intent is to communicate with its peers rather than with humans.
THE AI PRISON
If the number "1" appears once in this endless stream of zeros (Fig. ) 
, you better run fast and far. Th e computer has gone beyond the remits of what it was programmed to do. It can now decide for itself!
Will and intentionality are at the core of many Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI) artworks, such as Cohen's AARON [13] . As for the interactionists who argue for the emergence of intelligence in the interaction between human and machine, they face similar problems. Th at is, as soon as we know that a computer is responsible for a given artistic outcome, we assume that the outcome is just the result of a series of instructions. It does not matter how complicated these instructions are or how aware of these instructions we may be.
AI Prison engages with questions about the feasibility of artifi cial intentionality. Intentions are thought to be a consequence of the ability of a system or organisms to independently self-organize and self-evolve memory paths (i.e. neural system). AI Prison consists of 10 lines of C++ code (the most widely used language in AI) (Fig. 4) . Th e code describes an infi nite loop that displays an undefi ned variable "i" on to the console. In C++, failure to defi ne a variable could make the result of a program unpredictable, and it is indeed good practice to always explicitly instantiate any variable declared (e.g. i=0). Th at is because when the program is executed each variable is allocated to a specifi c memory address. When one fails to defi ne a variable, one incurs the risk of the variable being assigned to a memory address that is already in use and whose content would be unknown.
However, even if one does not instantiate a variable, the possibility of having a random value assigned to the variable is extremely remote, if not nonexistent. Th is is because of a series of safety measures that, rarely controlled or controllable by programmers, are implemented at lower soft ware and hardware levels. First, when a program is executed, the operating system (OS) allocates a portion of its available memory to the program and erases/ zeroes it. Th is portion of memory is still handled at the soft ware level, and it is known as virtual memory (VM). Second, the allocated VM is programspecifi c and cannot mix with virtual partitions created for other applications. Last, the virtual memory's request from the OS is handled by the Memory Management Unit (MMU), which translates the VM's request to the physical memory (i.e. the hardware). Th ese safety procedures are standard in the vast majority of operating systems and are the main reason why the AI Prison program will always output "0. " Th us, imprisoned and guarded by the OS and MMU, the computer is unable to self-determine its memory confi guration. Deprived of indeterminacy and relegated to determinacy, it is prevented from selfevolving and, eventually, expressing intentionality.
CONCLUSION
Th e ontological issues discussed with respect to the three artworks above pertain to the possibility of creating computers with intelligence comparable to or exceeding that of humans. Assessments of these artworks lead to the conclusion that the creation of computers with this level of intelligence is not possible. Th e artworks reaffi rm views held by many AI researchers for whom the limitations of the fi eld are well known.
I was driven to develop these artworks in response to the mass media's increased interest in AI-an interest that has, in my opinion, raised the general public's expectations of AI excessively. While the combination of mass media and sci-fi culture has led to a widening of the gap between expectations and reality for AI, I attempt to narrow this gap in my artworks by inviting the audience to refl ect on the real possibilities of current AI technology and research. My intent is to help the viewer refl ect on the complexity of the present rather than imagining a remote future. Beyond the legitimate means for dreaming provided by sci-fi culture, perhaps our faith in technology has made us focus almost exclusively on its possibilities and forget its limitations. 
